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Abstract
We analyze bubbles and crashes in a model in which some in-
vestors are partially sophisticated. While the expectations of such
investors are endogenously determined in equilibrium, these are based
on a coarse understanding of the market dynamics. We highlight
how such investors may endogenously switch from euphoria to panic
and how this may lead to equilibrium bubbles and crashes even in
a purely speculative market in which information is complete and it
is commonly understood that the bubble cannot grow forever. We
also show how this setting can match stylized empirical facts, and we
investigate whether bubbles may last longer when the share of fully
rational traders increases.
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11 Introduction
Speculative bubbles seem widespread (see Garber, 1990; Kindleberger, 2005)
but their foundations remain largely unclear. By de￿nition, in speculative
bubbles, investors are willing to pay high prices today only because they ex-
pect the selling price to be even higher in the future (Stiglitz, 1990). This is
typically inconsistent with rational expectations, at least when prices cannot
grow without bounds (Tirole, 1982). Speculative bubbles have often been
derived in the literature by assuming that some agents are either mechani-
cal in their trading decisions or that they hold exogenously given (typically
optimistic) expectations.1
This paper takes a di⁄erent approach. In our model, the expectations
of all agents are endogenously determined and investment strategies are de-
cided optimally given expectations. Agents are neither overcon￿dent nor
optimistic. But while some agents are fully rational in the sense of having
correct expectations, others are less sophisticated and form their expecta-
tions based on some coarse understanding of the working of the market. An
important contribution of this paper is to show that bubbles and crashes can
endogenously emerge in such contexts. In the analysis, we will highlight how
the expectations of partially sophisticated agents evolve along the life cycle
of the speculative market giving rise ￿rst to bubbles and then to crashes,
and we will suggest how the qualitative features of our equilibrium match
the intuitive wisdom about bubbles.
We develop our main ideas in a simple setting intended to be the least
favorable to bubbles. We consider a deterministic market with complete
information in which agents can trade an asset with no fundamental value.
Importantly, traders are heterogeneous in their ability to understand others￿
trading strategies, and thus in their expectations about the market dynamics.
We consider two extreme types of investors: fully rational investors who
have rational expectations, as usual; and partially sophisticated investors who
design their investment strategies based only on aggregate statistics about
1There is also a vast literature with overlapping generations in which bubbles allow for
capital transmission from one generation to the next. That viewpoint about bubbles is
complementary to the one developed here that views bubbles as purely speculative.
2market dynamics. These statistics will be formally de￿ned later on, but it
is worth emphasizing from now that in our model all agents, irrespective of
their degree of sophistication, have enough understanding of the situation
to realize that the market is overvalued and bound to crash (indeed, this is
common knowledge). We note that such an understanding is in line with the
observed evidence that, at least eventually, most agents realize they are in
a speculative market (see Shiller, 1989).2 Trade is then driven by the fact
that all agents believe, rightly or wrongly, that they can take advantage of
investing in the speculative market and exiting at the right time.
The key mistake our partially sophisticated investors make is in failing
to understand when, based on commonly observed history of trades, other
investors exit the market.3 Such a mistake is due to these investors￿partial
understanding of the market dynamics. In fact, in equilibrium, the statistics
employed by partially sophisticated investors match the actual market dy-
namics averaged over time, but they are assumed not to have access to more
precise statistics relating the market dynamics to the life cycle of the bubble.
We view the knowledge of the various types of investors as the result of
historical learning whereby, when facing a new bubble episode, investors form
their optimal strategies based on their knowledge about similar past bubble
episodes. Whether this knowledge is based on more or less detailed statistics
determines investors￿sophistication.
The basic mechanism which generates bubbles and crashes in our frame-
work is given by the resulting interaction between investors￿historical knowl-
edge and their observation of market trends in the current bubble episode (in
2Shiller (1989) reports that just before the U.S. stock market crash of October 1987,
84% of institutional investors thought that the market was overpriced; 78% of them
thought that this belief was shared by the rest of investors and, still, 93% of them were
net buyers. There are also several anecdotes about this. For example, Eric Janszen, a
leading commentator of speculative phenomena, wrote in the middle of the Internet bub-
ble (November 1999): "During the ￿nal stages, the mania participants ￿nally admit that
they are in a mania. But they rationalize that it￿ s OK because they ￿only they and not
the other participants ￿will get out in time." (article accessible at www.bankrate.com)
3This assumption may echo the observation that the day of the crash often appears to
be quite similar to many other days. Even the systematic analysis by Cutler, Poterba and
Summers (1989) concludes that "many of the largest market movements in recent years
have occurred on days when there were no major news events."
3line with the experimental evidence in Haruvy, Lahav and Noussair, 2007).
Partially sophisticated investors know the market dynamics averaged along
days in which most people want to buy and days in which most people want
to sell. As a result, they get a positive surprise after any "good day" and a
negative surprise after any "bad day". Speci￿cally, along our bubble equilib-
rium, investors ￿rst observe a series of rising prices. Partially sophisticated
investors interpret such unexpectedly high prices as a sign that the price can
go even further.4 In doing so, they end up remaining invested for too long.
Such investment strategies are in turn exploited by fully rational investors,
who feed the bubble for a while and exit just before the (endogenous) crash.
Upon observing the massive sale by rational investors, partially sophisticated
investors realize it is time to sell and this indeed leads to the crash.
In our main analysis, we de￿ne the structure of bubble equilibria in terms
of investment strategies and expectation dynamics (as sketched above), we
characterize the conditions for the existence of bubble equilibria, and we
analyze how the maximal duration of bubbles varies as a function of our pa-
rameters, in particular the share of rational investors and how new investors
are attracted as a function of the history of prices. We also discuss our
￿ndings in relation to stylized empirical evidence about bubbles and crashes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next subsection reviews
some of the key features of our model and discusses the related literature,
highlighting how the mechanism behind our bubble equilibrium di⁄ers from
existing ones. Our main model is presented in Section 2 and the analysis of
equilibrium strategies and expectations are derived in Section 3. In Section
4, we extend our setting by considering the case of uncertainty averse agents,
and we show that whether rational investors have a stabilizing role depends
on the attitude of investors toward uncertainty. In Section 5, we relate our
￿ndings to empirical evidence; we elaborate further on the interpretation of
our equilibrium concept and discuss the robustness of our results in richer
settings. Omitted proofs are provided in the Appendix.
4This captures a strong regularity documented in Shiller (2000). As the price increases,
more people display "bubble expectations", i.e. the belief that, despite the market being
overvalued, it will still increase for a while before the crash.
41.1 Related literature
There is a vast literature on speculative bubbles, and we only review some
general themes here.5 First, our approach di⁄ers from a good part of the liter-
ature in behavioral ￿nance in which non-fully rational investors are modeled
in an exogenous fashion (with no consistency requirement) and the focus is on
how rational investors would behave in such environments (Shleifer, 2000).
In particular, an important strand of this literature focuses on the e⁄ects
of purely mechanical traders (De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann,
1990a) or of agents who form their expectations about future prices simply by
extrapolating from past market trends (Cutler, Poterba and Summers, 1990
and De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann, 1990b). As emphasized
above, our equilibrium approach allows agents to have enough sophistication
to understand that they are in a bubble and that the market must crash (as
opposed to extrapolative agents, who in a phase of rising prices would expect
the prices to increase with no bounds). Moreover, as detailed in Section 4,
we di⁄er from this literature in that the potential destabilizing character of
rational agents in our setup can only arise when agents are ambiguity averse.
A second important strand of the literature on speculative bubbles builds
on the fact that some information, e.g. about the value of fundamentals, is
dispersed among agents and that agents hold subjective priors.6 We di⁄er
from this literature ￿rst as we consider a setting with complete information.
This allows us to highlight that bubbles in our setup are caused by the partial
sophistication of some traders rather than by the presence of asymmetric
information; also, this can be used to shed new light on the substantial
experimental evidence that bubbles emerge even in contexts in which the
structure of the game is commonly known to subjects (see Porter and Smith,
2003, for a review). Second, while similarly to approaches with subjective
5For a more detailed review, see e.g. Brunnermeier (2007).
6From a theoretical viewpoint, private information alone cannot explain bubbles, as
can be inferred from the no-trade theorems (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Somewhat more
generally, Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) show that bubbles may arise in a ￿nite
setting with private information only if one also introduces ex-ante ine¢ ciency, short sale
constraints, or lack of common knowledge of agents￿trades. See, in particular, Morris
(1996) and Biais and Bossaerts (1998) for models of speculation with subjective priors.
5priors we model agents with possibly erroneous expectations, an important
di⁄erence is that the perceptions of our boundedly rational agents derive from
correct (yet coarse) understanding of others￿strategies. There is no such
constraint in the approaches with subjective priors, in which the subjective
beliefs are left exogenous.7
It should also be mentioned that in contrast with our approach, the lit-
erature has typically modeled bubbles and crashes separately. For example,
Gennotte and Leland (1990) focus on the role of hedge funds in provoking the
crash while taking as given the fact that the market is overvalued. Abreu and
Brunnermeier (2003) focus on how coordination issues among rational arbi-
trageurs may delay the crash, while abstracting from the underlying process
generating the bubble. On the other hand, De Long, Shleifer, Summers and
Waldmann (1990b) explain how feedback trading can generate a bubble, but
exogenously impose an end period at which the crash occurs. Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003) show how overcon￿dence can sustain speculative trade but
do not consider how the crash may endogenously occur.8
Finally, by emphasizing the role of cognitive heterogeneity, our work is
related to a wide literature on the limits to information processing.9 In par-
ticular, our idea of equilibrium is in the spirit of Jehiel (2005) who assumes,
in the context of extensive form games, that each player understands only
the aggregate behavior of his opponents over a bundle of nodes/states.10 Our
7It may be argued that what is left exogenous in our setting is the ￿neness of the
statistical knowledge of agents. More work is required to assess empirically what kind of
statistical knowledge is available in practice. From a theoretical viewpoint, however, our
results hold for a broader class of cognitive types (see Section 5.3).
8A notable exception is Allen and Gale (2000) who provide a model in which bubbles
arise as debt-￿nanced investors are willing to pay high prices for a risky asset and crashes
occur when uncertainty in the real or in the ￿nancial sector resolves. Our model abstracts
both from uncertainty and agency problems in generating bubbles and crashes.
9See in particular Higgins (1996) for an exposition of the idea of accessibility in psy-
chology and Kahneman (2003) for economic applications. Many authors have explored
such themes in strategic interactions (see Rubinstein, 1998 and the references therein and
Jehiel, 1995; Jehiel, 2005; Jehiel and Samet, 2007), and ￿nancial markets (see Hirshleifer,
2001).
10A related idea is developed in static games of incomplete information by Eyster and
Rabin (2005). Alternative and complementary approaches to partial sophistication include
Nagel (1995), Stahl and Wilson (1995), and Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004). These
approaches di⁄er from ours in that they focus on initial play whereas we focus on behaviors
6model can be viewed as providing a ￿nance theoretical analog of such con-
cepts and it allows us to shed new light on the emergence of bubbles and
crashes and on the stabilizing role of arbitrageurs.
2 Model
Consider a market where an asset of fundamental value p0 is traded. In
each date t, a new population of cash-holders Kt is attracted to the market,
possibly as a function of the entire history of prices.11 Cash-holders have one
unit of wealth and, upon arrival, they decide whether or not to buy the stock
by submitting a demand schedule.12 It is assumed that neither borrowing
nor short-selling is possible. Let ￿t denote the fraction of cash-holders who
decide to buy. The amount of buy order at t is then given by:
Bt = ￿tKt:
Sell orders are due either to deliberate selling or to liquidity shocks. More
precisely, we denote by Xt the amount of outstanding stocks at date t; which
may vary with t (e.g. due to new stocks becoming tradable as lock-up periods
expire).13 In each period, with probability z; a stock holder is hit by a
liquidity shock which leads him to sell immediately and to stay out of the
market from then on. Denote by ￿t the fraction of stock-holders who decide
to sell. The amount of sell orders (including the exogenous supply of stocks
zXt induced by liquidity shocks) is then given by:
St = ￿tXt:
that would persist even after (imperfect) learning has taken place.
11See Barber and Odean (2008) for empirical evidence on which dynamics of prices and
trade volumes tend to attract investors￿attention.
12In Section 5.3, we brie￿ y discuss other trading strategies such as limit or stop-loss
orders.
13One may alternatively allow the ￿rm to deliver new stocks, in which case the following
analysis would go through with minor notational changes.
7The price pt in period t is determined by a standard market clearing condi-






In each period, each investor chooses an investment strategy that maximizes
his expected payo⁄. The payo⁄ to an individual who buys a stock at time
t and sells it at time s is simply (ps ￿ pt). That is, we ignore discounting
and risk aversion, and investment in our economy can only be driven by the
belief that the selling price will be higher in the future.14
Beliefs about future prices are based both on the observation of the history
of trades and on the expectation about other agents￿strategies. The history
of trades is public, so that agents share the same information. Moreover, the
way in which Kt and Xt depend on the history of trades is deterministic
and well-understood by everyone (speci￿c functional forms will be assumed
later on, whenever needed). Hence, for a given history of trade, expected
price dynamics are fully determined by the expectations about other agents￿
strategies. As already mentioned, investors di⁄er in how they form their
expectations about others￿strategies, which corresponds to di⁄erent levels of
sophistication ￿ and typically results in di⁄erent expectations about future
prices.
Formally, denote by p
￿;s
t (Hs;￿￿;s) the expectation made at the start of
period s by an agent i 2 ￿ about the price at t; where t ￿ s (a similar
notation is employed for the other endogenous variables). This expectation
depends on the commonly observed history of trades Hs = (p1;p2;:::;ps￿1)











t ): To illustrate our ideas, we consider a sit-
uation with two cognitive types: fully rational investors R, in proportion r;
and partially sophisticated agents I, in proportion (1￿r).15 (These propor-
tions apply both to new investors with cash and with stock.) Rational agents
14Introducing discounting would not alter the main conclusions of the paper and it would
make the analysis a little more cumbersome. Ambiguity aversion is brie￿ y considered in
Section 4.
15In Section 5 we brie￿ y discuss the case with a richer set of cognitive types.
8understand perfectly well the patterns of other investors￿strategies. Hence,
denoting by ￿t and ￿t the actual buy and sell rates arising in equilibrium,
their expectations must satisfy
￿
R;s
t = ￿t and ￿
R;s
t = ￿t for every t ￿ s: (2)
Partially sophisticated agents, on the other hand, expect constant buy and
sell rates throughout the duration of the speculative market, where these
rates coincide with the actual aggregate intensities averaged over time. Specif-
ically, denote by t = 1 the ￿rst date in which the trading price exceeds the
fundamental price p0 (the start of the bubble) and by t = T +1 the ￿rst date
in which the price goes back to the fundamental (the end of the bubble), as
determined in equilibrium. The average buy rate ￿ ￿ and the average sell rate
















t = ￿ ￿ and ￿
I;s
t = ￿ ￿ for every t ￿ s: (4)
Based on Hs and ￿￿;s, an agent of type ￿ forms expectations about the price
in period t ￿ s. Based on these expectations, he can design his optimal
investment strategy.
De￿nition 1 (Equilibrium): An investment strategy pro￿le is an equilibrium
if, all along the equilibrium path, each agent￿ s investment strategy maximizes
his expected payo⁄, given the expectations de￿ned in equations (2), (3) and
(4).
93 Analysis
3.1 Equilibrium strategies and expectations
Since agents are risk neutral, once they decide to trade, they trade their
entire holding of stock or cash. Optimal trading strategies at time t can be
expressed simply as a function of the expected prices at t and at t + 1 given
the information available at the start of t. An agent i 2 ￿ prefers to buy at










t the strategy of buying at t and





t buying at t would be dominated by buying at t+1:16 The
same argument applies to any agent j 2 ￿ with stocks who decides whether
to keep it or sell it.
We focus on bubble equilibria of the following form. In each period t ￿
T ￿1 everyone buys and only liquidity sellers (in proportion z) sell; in period
T, I-investors buy and R-investors sell; at T + 1; everyone tries to sell but





(1; z) for t ￿ T ￿ 1;
(1 ￿ r; z + r(1 ￿ z)) for t = T;
(0; 1) for t = T + 1:
(6)
Given the expressions of ￿t and ￿t in (6), and the consistency condition (3),





16Without loss of generality, we assume that when indi⁄erent an individual invests.
17Intuitively, trade occurs either among people with di⁄erent needs, as described by the




Tz + r(1 ￿ z) + 1
T + 1
; (8)
respectively. Together with the form of Kt and Xt, expectations over the
buy and sell rates translate into expectations about future prices.
For this to be an equilibrium, we need that, up to T; I-agents expect the
price to increase in the next period and that at T + 1 they expect the price












Moreover, for R-agents to ￿nd their strategy optimal, the price must be
increasing up to T and it must be dropping at T + 1: Thus,
pt ￿ pt￿1 for each t ￿ T; (11)
and
pT+1 < pT: (12)
At this point in order to explore further the existence and properties of
bubble equilibria, we need to specify functional forms for Kt and Xt.18 While
the amount of new investors may depend on the entire history of prices and
expectations, we simplify the analysis by assuming that Kt depends only
on pt￿1 and pt￿2; in particular, more investors are attracted when pt￿1 is
higher and the marginal e⁄ect of an increase in pt￿1 is higher when pt￿1
exceeds pt￿2. The idea that higher prices yesterday attract more investors
has been documented by Barber and Odean (2008). The relation with pt￿2
may be interpreted viewing pt￿2 as a reference point for pt￿1 so that when
pt￿1 > pt￿2 more investors are attracted at t as a function of pt￿1 than when
18In Section 5.3, we discuss the sensitivity of our results to di⁄erent functional forms.
11pt￿1 < pt￿2.19 Speci￿cally, we assume that, for t > 1,
Kt(pt￿1;pt￿2) =
(
￿Hpt￿1 if pt￿1 > pt￿2;
￿Lpt￿1 if pt￿1 ￿ pt￿2;
(13)
where ￿L ￿ ￿H: To complete the description, we exogenously set pt = p0 = 0
for t ￿ 0 and K1 = K; with K > 0.
Moreover, we capture the idea that in bubble episodes speculative stocks
tend to be progressively released in the market (Cochrane, 2002; Hong,
Scheinkman and Xiong, 2006) by assuming that a mass X of stock becomes
tradable (exogenously) in each period. The amount of outstanding stocks in
t is then
Xt = tX: (14)
We assume the functions (13) and (14) are commonly known and well un-
















The strategies de￿ned above constitute a bubble equilibrium if conditions (9),
(10), (11), (12) are satis￿ed. We now analyze how these conditions de￿ne
the equilibrium duration of the bubble T.
3.2 Equilibrium duration of a bubble
We ￿rst observe that irrespective of the buying and selling strategies of in-
vestors, bubbles must burst in ￿nite time. Even if (￿t;￿t) = (1;z) for all t,
19Viewing pt￿2 as a reference point for pt￿1 is reminiscent of prospect theory (see Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979). Alternative models would allow agents￿expectations to a⁄ect
the reference point (as in Koszegi and Rabin, 2006). Our formulation allows for a simpler
analysis even if we expect similar insights with these alternative models of reference points.
12pt+1 ￿ pt requires




thereby making of T0 an upper bound on the duration of bubbles. However,
the equilibrium duration of a bubble will typically be much smaller than T0:
The maximal duration of the bubble is de￿ned by two conditions (we only
sketch the analysis here and leave a more detailed derivation for Section 6.1
in the Appendix). The ￿rst is condition (9), which must hold in particular
for t = T: This writes






where ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿ are de￿ned in (7) and (8). De￿ning T1 as the largest T such
that T +1 = W(T) (assuming for now it exists), it can be shown with simple
algebra that condition (9) de￿nes an upper bound on T, e.g.
T ￿ T1: (16)
This upper bound comes from the fact that, as time goes by, I-investors
perceive that the selling pressure increases more than the buying capacity.
This implies that rational investors cannot sell too late otherwise I-investors
would not buy.
A second upper bound on T is de￿ned by condition (11). In particular,
(11) must hold for t = T, which requires
T ￿
(1 ￿ r)￿H
(z + r(1 ￿ z))X
￿ T2: (17)
The upper bound T2 comes from the fact that, since rational investors accu-
mulate stocks as the bubble grows, they cannot wait too long before selling
or they would not ￿nd enough irrational investors to absorb the selling pres-
sure. We can then de￿ne the largest T that can be sustained in equilibrium,
denoted by Tmax; as the minimal T satisfying both condition (16) and (17),
i.e.
Tmax ￿ minfT1;T2g:
13We also notice that in equilibrium the bubble cannot be too short either.
This is due to the requirement that I-investors should sell at T + 1, as
expressed by condition (10), and so that the buying capacity at T +1 should
not be too large. As shown in Section 6.1, this in turn imposes a lower bound
on T whereby rational investors cannot sell too early otherwise I-investors
would not sell at T + 1 and the market would not crash (so R-agents would
make more pro￿t by selling later than at T). Finally, it can easily be shown
that if I-investors sell at T +1 they do not buy at any later point in time, so
R-investors have no incentive to buy at T +1. This implies ￿T+1 = 0 and so
pT+1 = p0 = 0. Hence, if condition (10) is satis￿ed, condition (12) follows.
We can now characterize when a T ￿ 1 satisfying conditions (9)-(12)
exists as a function of the exogenous parameters ￿H;￿L;X; z and r. As in
standard models, we cannot have bubbles if all investors are fully rational.
In particular, r has to be small enough so that all rational agents are able




￿H ￿ zX + X
￿ rmax:
Hence, we can de￿ne a necessary condition for the existence of a bubble
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 There exists a rmax < 1 such that if r > rmax; then no bubble
equilibrium exists.
We then provide su¢ cient conditions for the existence of a bubble equilib-
rium, characterizing in particular when the bubble duration Tmax = minfT1;T2g
can be sustained in equilibrium. Again, we only sketch the intuition here and
leave a more formal analysis to the Appendix (Section 6.1). Suppose ￿rst
that T1 < T2; which is the case when r is su¢ ciently small.20 Since by de-
￿nition T1 is the latest date at which I-investors buy, they sell at T1 + 1;
as required by condition (10). Hence, conditions (9)-(12) would be satis￿ed
at T1 and we only need to make sure that T1 ￿ 1: Given (15), a su¢ cient
condition for having T1 ￿ 1 is that W(T) and T +1 intersects once for T ￿ 1;
20See Section 6.2 for a more detailed characterization.
14which is the case when W(1) ￿ 2: This writes






where it is easy to see that ￿￿
H increases in X;r and z. The reason why a
su¢ ciently large ￿H is required for the existence of a bubble equilibrium is
that the amount of new investors entering in each period is then su¢ ciently
large to induce I-investors to buy for a while.
If instead T2 < T1; conditions (9)-(12) would be satis￿ed if I-investors




(T2 + 1)X ￿ ￿
￿
L(r;z;X); (19)
where ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿ are de￿ned at T2 and one can easily show that ￿￿
L > 0 and
￿￿
L < ￿H. The reason why a su¢ ciently small ￿L is required for a bubble to
emerge is that when T2 is smaller than T1; I-investors would not sell at T2+1
unless the drop in the entry of new investors is su¢ ciently large. Since by
de￿nition pT2 = pT2￿1; by (13) we would have KT2+1 = ￿LpT2 and for a large
drop in Kt we would need ￿L su¢ ciently small.21
More complete results are expressed in the following Proposition, which
shows that bubble equilibria can emerge when ￿H is large enough and when
￿L; X; z and r are small enough.
Proposition 2 If ￿L < ￿￿
L and ￿H ￿ ￿￿
H; then the above investment strate-
gies with T = Tmax de￿ne a bubble equilibrium. Moreover, Tmax increases in
￿H and decreases with X; z and r:
3.3 Expectations dynamics
We can now illustrate how investors￿expectations evolve along a bubble
equilibrium with maximal duration as characterized by T = Tmax. Fully
21We are here ignoring integer problems and assume that T2 is indeed an integer. If this
were not the case, then we would require R-agents to randomize and sell at T2 and T2 ￿1
so to make sure that indeed pT2 = pT2￿1: This would slightly change equation (6) without
changing the substance of our analysis.
15rational agents have rational expectations, and so their expectation about
the price dynamics is unchanged (and correct) throughout the duration of the
bubble. As far as I-agents are concerned, their expectations may typically
change once they observe the actual realized prices. More precisely, after
any t < T; I-agents revise their expectation about the future prices upwards.
This is because, in all these periods, ￿t > ￿ ￿ and ￿t < ￿ ￿ and so the realized
prices are higher than expected. An higher price attracts more investors
and, for a given expectation about future buy and sell rates, this allows
prices to be even higher in the future. On the other hand, upon observing
the realized price at T, I-agents revise their expectation about the future
prices downwards whenever the realized price is lower than expected, which
happens whenever ￿T < ￿ ￿ and ￿T > ￿ ￿. This requires that r be not too small.





T+1 , Tr > 1; (20)
where the condition Tr > 1 implicitly de￿nes a minimum r1 > 0 such that
Tr > 1 only if r > r1 (see Section 6.2 for the derivation). Hence, if rational
investors are su¢ ciently many, their massive sale at T is bad news for the
market as it makes I-investors realize that the prices will indeed be lower
than expected.
I-investors￿expectation about the date of the crash, instead, remains
unchanged for t < T. This is due to the fact that, as long as pt￿1 > pt￿2;
Kt is a linear function of pt￿1. As shown in equation (21), this makes I-
investors￿strategy insensitive to the current price realization.22 A change in
their expectation about the date of the crash may instead occur when the
amount of new investors entering the market at T+1 is very low, that is, when
pT = pT￿1 and ￿L is su¢ ciently low. For pT = pT￿1, we need that T = T2
and so T2 < T1 (otherwise T2 could not be sustained as an equilibrium). The
condition T2 < T1 writes
W(T2) > T2 + 1;
22Of course, this would not be the case if K(t) were not a linear function of pt￿1: See
Section 5 for a discussion.
16which as shown in Section 6.2 is satis￿ed when r is su¢ ciently large. In
particular, there exists a r2 > r1 such if T2 < T1 then it must be that r > r2.
Moreover, for having a large drop in the amount of new investors, we need











That is, upon observing that the price has not increased due to the massive
sale of rational investors, I-investors become aware that they had overesti-
mated the duration of the bubble and that the price will drop at T + 1 and
never recover. We can summarize our results in the following Proposition.
Proposition 3 There exist r1 > 0 and r2 > r1 such that, upon observing the
exit of R-agents at T, I-agents realize that future prices will be lower than
expected only if
r > r1;
and they realize that the bubble will be shorter than expected only if
r > r2:
4 Uncertainty Aversion
In this section we extend our basic model to allow for uncertainty aversion.23
In our setting, uncertainty concerns solely the predictions of other investors￿
strategies (otherwise, the underlying dynamics is deterministic). Hence, the
amount of uncertainty faced by each agent depends on his ability to under-
stand these strategies. Rational agents face no uncertainty given that they
23Uncertainty (or equivalently ambiguity) describes situations in which agents￿percep-
tions need not be accurate enough to provide them with a unique probability measure over
the possible states of the world.
17have perfect understanding. But, I-agents face an uncertain environment
given that they only know coarse statistics about others￿investment atti-
tudes. When an I-agent is su¢ ciently uncertainty averse, he may refrain
from investing.
We will describe how to extend our basic model to cover such a situation
with the aim of shedding new light on the relation between the magnitude
of bubbles and the proportion of rational investors. This is a fundamental
issue for the e¢ cient market hypothesis, whereby rational investors play a
stabilizing role and ensure market e¢ ciency.
The e¢ cient market hypothesis has been challenged by the behavioral ￿-
nance literature, most notably by De Long et al. (1990b). In their model, the
presence of extrapolative investors (who buy when the price has increased)
induces rational investors to arti￿cially increase the price and then sell at
an even higher price to extrapolative agents. The higher the share of ratio-
nal agents the higher are initial prices, the more distorted are extrapolative
agents￿expectations and so the larger is the size of the bubble.
In our basic model without uncertainty aversion, increasing the share of
rational investors always reduces the duration of the maximal bubble (see
Proposition 2), thereby suggesting a sharp contrast with the literature based
on extrapolative agents.24 But, the relation between the maximal bubble and
the share of rational investors can go the other way in the extension of our
model to uncertainty aversion. The basic reason is that, even if uncertainty
averse, fully rational agents may still be willing to invest since as noted they
face no uncertainty. This is not the case for uncertainty-averse I-agents.
As a result, the amount of investors in the speculative market is in general
increasing with the share of rational agents, which may in turn induce more
optimistic expectations and sustain longer bubbles. We think this paper is
the ￿rst to highlight the role of uncertainty aversion in the relation between
rational agents and bubbles.
In order to formally illustrate this idea, we assume that investors di⁄er
24Of course, there are other models which make the same prediction as this one. In
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), for example, rational investors stay invested longer the
higher is the buying capacity of irrational agents; then, the lower the share of irrational
investors the lower is their buying capacity and so the shorter is the bubble.
18in their attitudes towards ambiguity. Each agent irrespective of his cognitive
type is ambiguity averse with probability h and ambiguity neutral with prob-
ability 1 ￿ h. Ambiguity aversion is not relevant for R-investors, however,
since such investors face no ambiguity, as observed above. For I-investors,
instead, let us denote by H those who are ambiguity-averse and by L those
who are ambiguity neutral. The respective masses of H and L investors are
(1￿r)h and (1￿r)(1￿h). Admitting that their predictions can be mistaken
by some ", H-agents believe that, in every t, the actual buy rate ￿t will be
in the interval [￿ ￿ ￿ "; ￿ ￿ + "] \ [0;1] and the actual sell rate ￿t will be in the
interval [￿ ￿￿"; ￿ ￿+"]\[0;1].25 Furthermore, these agents choose the optimal
investment strategy by considering the worst realizations of ￿t and ￿t.26 In-
vestors of type L are instead neutral towards uncertainty (or, alternatively,
they do not admit that their predictions can be mistaken). Hence, as in
Section 3, such investors only consider the averages ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿:
We de￿ne an equilibrium similar to the one above in which H-agents stop
investing as soon as they can (this requires " to be large enough), R-agents
exit at some T, and L-agents exit at T +1, when the crash occurs. As above,
the maximal duration of the bubble Tmax is de￿ned by two conditions: L-
agents should buy at T, which de￿nes T1; and pT ￿ pT￿1; which de￿nes T2:
As detailed in the Appendix, the e⁄ect of increasing r on Tmax depends on
whether T1 or T2 binds. In fact, it can be shown that T2 decreases with r;
while T1 increases in r if and only if Th > 1: Hence, provided that h is not
too small, Tmax increases in r when T1 < T2. This is the case when r is not
too large. We state this more formally in the next Proposition.
Proposition 4 If Th > 1; there exists a ^ r 2 (0;1) such that Tmax increases
in r for every r ￿ ^ r:
25The error term " is here taken as given. One could for example endogenize this interval
by letting the expected ￿t and ￿t lie between the minimum and the maximum buy and
sell rates observed along the equilibrium.
26Formally, we are assuming that these investors have a set of probability measures over
the possible realizations of ￿t and ￿t: Investors compute the minimal expected payo⁄s
conditional on each possible prior, and decide the investment strategy corresponding to
the maximum of such payo⁄s. This idea, which may be thought as an extreme form of
uncertainty aversion, was formalized by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
195 Discussion
5.1 Relation with empirical evidence
Our equilibrium construction matches several empirical regularities of bubble
episodes. First, bubbles are characterized not only by extreme price ￿ uctu-
ations but also by high volumes of trade (Cochrane, 2002; Hong and Stein,
2007). In our model, the volume of trade increases over time, and it reaches
its peak just before the crash, when heterogeneity of expectations is high-
est.27 Second, speculative stocks tend to be initially in short supply and
bubbles are sustained by the large involvement of new investors (Cochrane,
2002; Kindleberger, 2005). This is consistent with our ￿nding in Proposition
2 that bubbles are likely to be bigger when ￿H is larger and/or when X
is smaller. Third, bubbles tend to display slow booms and sudden crashes
(Veldkamp, 2005), which is consistent with the e⁄ect of a small z as this
implies that the selling pressure increases slowly.
Another fundamental ingredient of bubble episodes is that market partici-
pants become increasingly euphoric and then (some of them) realize they have
been invested for too long and panic (Shleifer, 2000; Kindleberger, 2005). In
our model, the same group of investors may switch from euphoria to panic
along the equilibrium when rational investors are not too few. Such a ￿nding
thus requires the presence of both rational and irrational investors and we
suspect that this may be a plausible feature of real bubbles. Indeed, real
bubbles seem to attract a large number of inexperienced investors: for ex-
ample, Greenwood and Nagel (2008) and Gri¢ n, Harris, Shu and Topaloglu
(2009) show that inexperienced investors sustained the Internet bubble (see
also Kindleberger, 2005). This is in line with Proposition 1 which shows that
r should not be too large in such cases to make the emergence of bubbles
possible. At the same time, as in the spirit of Proposition 3, it appears that
rational investors too invest in real bubbles. Indeed, Brunnermeier and Nagel
(2004) and Temin and Voth (2004) document how in various bubble episodes
27Moreover, while we here abstract from this mechanism, these volumes may in itself
reinforce the bubble as investors tend to pay attention to stocks with abnormal trade
volumes (see Barber and Odean, 2008).
20major investors earned large pro￿ts by timing the market correctly.
Last, by focusing on a setting in which information is complete but some
people face limitations in processing all the relevant aspects of such informa-
tion, we stress that information availability per se need not lead to market e¢ -
ciency. Instead, we point out that information accessibility -which focuses on
whether information is presented in a way that facilitates its interpretation-
should matter as well. For example, our analysis may be suggestive of the
idea that when ￿nancial advisors concentrate on aggregate statistics such as
the long term pro￿tability of some types of investments (as opposed to high-
lighting the more complete charts showing the life cycle of asset prices), there
is a risk that less sophisticated investors extrapolate from this information
in a way that makes the emergence of bubbles more likely. It may also be
the case that some news have a destabilizing e⁄ect as it may lead partially
sophisticated investors to get excessively excited. (This is in a sense what
happens in our model when these investors observe unexpected increases in
the price.) Indeed, a number of recent papers have documented the desta-
bilizing role of media coverage on asset pricing (see among others Dyck and
Zingales, 2003; Veldkamp, 2006; Tetlock, 2007; Bhattacharya, Galpin, Ray
and Yu, 2009).
5.2 Interpretation of the equilibrium
The key methodological contribution of our approach is to o⁄er an equilib-
rium perspective to the behavior of non-fully rational investors. Endogenizing
the expectations of non-fully rational investors allows us to study how these
depend on the strategic environment and at how they evolve along the bub-
ble. We come back here to the interpretation of our equilibrium approach.
As often with equilibrium approaches, we think of it as the result of a
process of learning. More precisely, we have in mind that over long periods,
bubble episodes repeat periodically with new cohorts of investors. Investors
interpret the current market in light of historical data about similar episodes,
but investors may be heterogeneous in terms of which statistics they consider
to analyze these data. While our fully rational investors analyze such data
21with elaborate statistics, which leads them to know ￿t and ￿t and so to
rightly understand the trade dynamics, partially sophisticated investors use
a simpli￿ed model, able to provide the correct averages ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿ but no more
detailed statistics. In a sense, they apply a linear model to analyze trade
dynamics that are not necessarily linear (as in the spirit of Sargent, 1993).
It should be emphasized that we do not view I-investors as computing
the averages ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿ from the sequence of ￿t and ￿t; which they are not
assumed to know: They know the average buying and selling strategies, and
no more, in the same way that some inexperienced investors in the real word
are only informed that on average the stock market yields higher returns
than the housing market but are not informed of the speci￿c circumstances
in which the converse relation may hold.
Given that I-investors know only ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿, there is no way in which, based
on their historical knowledge, these investors could update their expectations
about the future buying and selling strategies as a function of the history of
trade.28 This is why, even when they observe realizations of ￿t and ￿t which
are di⁄erent from the mean, I-agents keep expecting that future ￿t and ￿t
will match ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿. They may understand that they only know the average
from which actual realizations may di⁄er, but, as sketched in Section 4, this
may not be enough to prevent the occurrence of bubbles.29
28In particular, as these strategies are all investors know, they need not know that there
are di⁄erent types of investors in the market. Hence, I-agents are not aware that other
investors may have a more accurate understanding of the market dynamics. Otherwise,
given that in our model trades mostly occur for speculative reasons, I-agents may simply
decide to stay outside the market if they realize they are less sophisticated than others.
29One may also think of other reasons for why I-agents do not update their model
about the underlying distribution of strategies. For example, they may perceive that some
stochastic element, speci￿c to the current bubble, a⁄ects both demand and supply. It
is not di¢ cult to accommodate our model to incorporate extra randomness, and in this
case any realization of prices and trade volumes would be possibly compatible with the
expected ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿. As another alternative, assuming agents adjust their theory when it
is proven su¢ ciently wrong, agents in our model get a strong enough signal that their
trading decisions are wrong only when it is too late.
225.3 Robustness and extensions
This paper has o⁄ered a framework to analyze speculative bubbles in an
equilibrium fashion in which investors di⁄er in their cognitive abilities. The
key mistake partially sophisticated investors make is in predicting when other
investors stop buying and so when the crash occurs. As already argued,
such a prediction is likely not to be accurate as abrupt changes in investors￿
strategies tend to occur even with no major news, in days quite similar
to days in which most investors wanted to buy. Nonetheless, I-investors￿
expectation of constant buy and sell rates throughout the bubble episode
may be too extreme as well. While we leave for future research the task of
exploring more systematically alternative cognitive assumptions, we suspect
that our results will be robust to broader speci￿cations of the cognitive types.
Suppose for illustration that partially sophisticated investors distinguish
two phases of the bubble: they expect some ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿ to occur in each t <
t￿ and some other ￿ ￿
0 and ￿ ￿
0 to occur at each t ￿ t￿; where as above these ex-
pectations correspond to the true average strategies played within each stage
of the bubble. Consider the bubble equilibrium described in equation (6) and
suppose t￿ ￿ T: During the early stage of the bubble, I-agents￿expectation
is correct since strategies are indeed constant. The expectation in the sec-
ond stage of the bubble depends on t￿: The higher is t￿ the more precisely
late strategies are perceived. In particular, the higher t￿, the less optimistic
is I-agents￿expectation and so the lower is the maximal sustainable bub-
ble. However, to the extent that the strategies played in the last period of
the bubble are perceived with some error, i.e. t￿ ￿ T; one can de￿ne some
parameter values such that a bubble equilibrium exists.
Another extension worth exploring is on the characteristics of the demand
and supply that would increase the magnitude of bubbles. Regarding the
amount of new investors attracted in every period t, we have previously
considered a (piecewise) linear Kt (in pt￿1); which simpli￿ed the analysis and
made optimal investment strategies independent on the currently realized
price. The assumption that ￿L ￿ ￿H; allows to express in a simple way
how the exit of rational investors represents a bad shock for other investors￿
23expectation. As shown in Proposition 3, when r > r2 and ￿L < ￿￿
L; the exit
of rational investors at T is su¢ cient to induce I-investors to believe that the
crash will occur at T +1. This makes our result on the emergence of bubbles
even stronger, since in this case rational investors would always be in the
position to successfully attack the bubble (while at the same time having the
incentive not to attack it immediately, as in Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2003).
On the other hand, the possibility of having an endogenous crash in our
framework does not crucially depend on ￿L: Even if T2 < T1 and ￿L = ￿H,
R-investors could sell gradually between T2 and T1 and the crash would occur
at T1 + 1 (thereby making the crash somewhat less sudden): Equation (6),
and the subsequent computations of (3), would be slightly modi￿ed, but the
substance of our analysis would remain valid.
More generally, the functional form of Kt determines the relation between
market trends and expectations dynamics, as analyzed in Section 3.3. If Kt
is increasing, a price higher than expected always leads I-investors to expect
even higher prices in the future. Their corresponding expectation about the
duration of the bubble, instead, depends on the curvature of Kt. If Kt is con-
vex (concave), an higher price than expected moves the expected date of the
crash upwards (downwards). Accordingly, if Kt is convex (concave), optimal
strategies de￿ned in (5) would take the form of stop (limit) orders, whereby
investors buy if the price falls above (below) a given threshold. While the
analysis would be more complicated, the spirit of our exercise would sur-
vive in that, given di⁄erent expectations about other investors￿strategies, I-
investors and R-investors would typically employ di⁄erent threshold. These
di⁄erences in opinion may lead to ￿ uctuations in the price which can then
be exploited by rational investors. Getting more precise information about
the shape of Kt would allow to test the link between market trends and how
expectations evolve in the life cycle of speculative markets.
Finally, as another extension, one may consider agents who would base
their trading strategies on aggregate statistics other than the ones considered
in this paper. For example, one such statistics could be the aggregate price
growth rates. In this case, assuming agents somehow know that the price
cannot go beyond some threshold, we could generate bubble dynamics similar
24to the ones found above (with investors updating their expectations about
future prices upon observing current price realizations). Thus, for some sta-
tistical knowledge, the dynamics would be rather similar to the one found in
our model. For other statistics, though, the analysis would be rather di⁄er-
ent. For example, if investors considered average prices at the peak of the
bubble or average durations of the bubble, there would be no way in which
they could update their expectations upon the observation of current market
trends. At the same time, in a completely deterministic model as above, this
knowledge would prevent the emergence of bubbles (since the duration of
past bubbles would be the same as in the current bubble). Our analysis has
considered learning of investment strategies as we believe the fundamental
issue that investors face in real bubble episodes lies in understanding how
other investors￿strategies evolve.30 Nonetheless, a more systematic investi-
gation of how di⁄erent types of learning a⁄ect investment decisions and the
functioning of the market remains in our view a very interesting avenue for
future research.
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306 Omitted proofs
6.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Observe ￿rst that since (￿t;￿t) = (1;z) for t ￿ T ￿ 1 and T < T0; we have





￿ ￿(t + 1)X
￿ p
I;t





for each t ￿ T: (21)
In particular, (21) must hold for t = T. Substituting ￿ ￿ and ￿ ￿ with (7) and
(8), we have
T + 1 ￿
T ￿ r




where it can be shown with simple algebra that W(T) is increasing and
concave in T: De￿ning T1 as the largest T such that T +1 = W(T); condition
(9) de￿nes an upper bound on T as expressed in (16) in the text.
Turning to condition (10), we need to distinguish two cases, depending
on whether or not p
I;T+1
T+1 exceeds pT. Suppose ￿rst that p
I;T+1









￿ ￿(T + 2)X
< p
I;T+1
T+1 , T + 2 > W(T): (23)
Similarly to above, let T3 be the largest T such that T + 2 = W(T). Then,
condition (10) de￿nes a lower bound on T such that
T > T3; (24)
where it is clear from (15) and (23) that T3 < T1:31 Suppose instead that
p
I;T+1




T+1 . Condition (10) now writes
T + 2 >
T ￿ r
Tz + r(1 ￿ z) + 1
￿L
X
￿ f W(T): (25)
31Notice also that if t were continuous we would have T1 = T3 so T would be pinned
down by conditions (15) and (23) when p
I;T+1
T+1 > pT.
31As before, let ~ T3 be the largest T such that T +2 = f W(T). Then, condition
(10) de￿nes a lower bound on T such that
T > ~ T3; (26)
where ~ T3 ￿ T3 follows from ￿L ￿ ￿H: From equations (23) and (25), it also
clear that if I-investors sell at T +1 then they do not buy at any later point
in time.
We can now derive more formally when Tmax can be sustained as equilibrium:
If T1 ￿ T2; Tmax is an equilibrium if T1 ￿ 1 and if I-investors sell at T1 + 1:
Given the shape of the function W(T) described in (22), W(T) and T + 1
intersects once and only once when W(T) ￿ T +1 for T = 1. This is used to
derive condition (18) in the text, which ensures that T1 ￿ 1: Given that as
noticed T1 > T3 ￿ ~ T3, condition (10) is satis￿ed at T1 so indeed I-investors







To see when (27) holds, suppose ￿rst that p
I;T2+1
T2+1 > pT2; then (27) writes
￿ ￿￿H
￿ ￿(T2 + 2)X
< 1;
which is not satis￿ed unless T2 > T3: Hence, in general, we need that
p
I;T2+1
T2+1 ￿ pT2: (28)
Notice that since pT2 = pT2￿1; (28) writes
￿ ￿￿L






(T2 + 1)X ￿ ￿
￿
L(r;z;X);
which is condition (19) in the text. If (19) holds, then (28) holds and (27)
32writes
￿ ￿￿L
￿ ￿(T2 + 2)X
< 1:
The last inequality is implied by (19), which is then a su¢ cient condition for
T2 to be an equilibrium. Finally, notice that ￿￿
L > 0 and ￿￿






and we are considering the case T2 < T1:
Turning to the second part of the Proposition, to see that T1 increases in
￿H and decreases with X; z and r recall that T1 is de￿ned by T +1 = W(T)
and notice with simple algebra that W(T) increases in ￿H and decreases with
X; z and r for all T. The fact that T2 increases in ￿H and decreases with X;
z and r can be derived by simple di⁄erentiation of equation (17).
6.2 Proof of Proposition 3
We ￿rst show that there exists a r1 > 0 such that for (20) to be satis￿ed we













that is KT+1 < K
I;T

















With simple algebra, it can be shown that condition (29) is satis￿ed if and
only if Tr > 1; which is condition (20) in the text: In particular, recall that
we must have T ￿ T2; so rT2 > 1: Doing the algebra, the last inequality is
satis￿ed (if ever) for r 2 (r1;r
0
1); where r1 > 0.
We then show that there exists a r2 > 0 such that if T2 < T1 then it
33must be that r > r2. Notice ￿rst that since by de￿nition W(T) > T + 1 for
T < T1; T2 < T1 writes
W(T2) > T2 + 1: (30)





and since, from (15), W(T) is bounded above by ￿H=zX; then (30) is not
satis￿ed for r = 0. Moreover, both T2 and W(T2) are decreasing in r. Doing
the algebra, (30) is satis￿ed (if ever) for r 2 (r2;r
0
2); where r2 > 0.












Hence, condition (29) is necessary but not su¢ cient for (30).
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
We consider an equilibriumwhere (for simplicity) H-investors perceive enough
uncertainty to be induced to stop investing as soon as they can (for example,
they understand that ￿t and ￿t are drawn by distributions with support on
[0;1] and since they are extremely ambiguity-adverse they assume ￿t = 0 and
￿t = 1 for all t). R-agents exit at some T, and L-agents exit at T + 1, when
the crash occurs (we use the same notation about T than in the previous
analysis even thought the variables are obviously not the same unless h = 0).





(1 ￿ (1 ￿ r)h; z + (1 ￿ z)(1 ￿ r)h) for t ￿ T ￿ 1
((1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ h); z + (1 ￿ z)(r + (1 ￿ r)h)) for t = T
(0; 1) for t = T + 1:
The maximal duration of the bubble Tmax is de￿ned by two conditions: L-
agents should buy at T, that is






34which de￿nes T1; where T1 increases in the ratio ￿ ￿=￿ ￿: I-agents are induced
to expect the buy and sell rates
￿ ￿ =





1 + Tz + T(1 ￿ z)h ￿ r(1 ￿ z)(Th ￿ 1)
T + 1
:
From the above expression it is clear that ￿ ￿=￿ ￿ increases in r if and only if
Th > 1; so T1 increases in r if and only if Th > 1. The second condition is
that pT ￿ pT￿1; which de￿nes
T2 ￿
(1 ￿ r)(1 ￿ h)




which is decreasing in r: Hence, if Th > 1; Tmax ￿ minfT1;T2g increases in
r when T1 < T2. To see when this is the case, notice that at r = 0; T1 < T2
since T2 + 1 > W(T2): In fact for T = T2













Notice also that at r = 1; T1 > 0 = T2: Since for Th > 1, T2 decreases with
r while T1 increases in r, there exists a unique ^ r 2 (0;1) such that T1 < T2
for every r ￿ ^ r; that is Tmax increases in r for every r ￿ ^ r:
35